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Stage 1: an analySiS of preSent-day StructureS (2012)
The case of the French Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA)
Through regulation the state delegates part of its authority to an intermediary entity. 
Regulation of media is established between government and communicators to preserve or 
correct the market balance. Its role can vary from country to country, as it can either ensure 
that official texts are respected and applied, or encourage the adoption of standards for 
better practices. In France, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) acts as a buffer-agency, 
with members from the state, from the profession and, to a much lesser extent, from civil 
society (the association in defence of families, UNAF, was part of the first CSA). 
Historically, the Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel was the first entity to regulate media in 
France (1982-1986). It was replaced by the Commission Nationale de la Communication et des 
Libertés (1986 à 1989) created by the law of September 30th 1986. The CNCL privatized TF1 
and attributed the 5th and 6th channels (La Cinq and M6). In 1989, after much controversy, 
the CSA was created. Its task has consisted in monitoring the broadcasting norms (for high 
fidelity) and in negotiating the commercial licensing of public airwaves, as often required 
by the private sector itself. With the rise of an organized consumer sector, and under the 
pressure of public opinion as well as political will, CSA has progressively been involved in 
the management of disputes concerning ethical standards and public service obligations 
of the networks. It has been required to be increasingly transparent as to its procedures. It 
cannot practice a priori censorship of programmes but can admonish and fine a posteriori.  
NB: This report considers the activities of the CSA in the field of audiovisual media, 
with a focus on pluralism and protection of minors through the use of examples.
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1. legal framework
1.1 Designation anD legal Definition of the state meDia regulatory boDy
The media regulatory authority in France is the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA, 
audiovisual superior Council) based in Paris. The CSA was established in 1989 by the law of 
17th January 1989 that modified the law of 30th September 1986 relating to communication 
freedom.  Its duties include the distribution of frequencies to operators, the organization of 
electoral campaigns (on radio and TV) and control of content (protection of minors, respect 
for pluralistic expression, fair treatment of news, respect for human dignity, protection of 
consumers as well as “the protection and illustration of the French language and culture”).  
More recently new duties have been added: making TV programmes available to people 
hard of hearing or visually impaired, ensuring the representation of the diversity within French 
society, contributing to actions in favour of health education and protection, etc. 
1.2 What are the legal Documents (laWs, rules, protocols, others) framing the meDia 
regulatory entity?
The CSA is an “independent administrative agency” of the government whose task it to 
ensure that the law on communication is applied.   The 9 members are nominated for 6 years 
by presidential decree, but only three are designated by the President; three more are desig-
nated by the president of the National Assembly and the last three are nominated by the 
president of the Senate. They cannot be nominated for two mandates and their membership 
is renewed by a third every two years. They have to adhere to a code of ethics and they cannot 
have any other employment in the private or public sector.  Their nomination is political and 
is not based on any precise criteria. This can be problematic for independence when all the 
members belong to the same political majority, in spite of the biennial rotation by a third.
1.3 relationship With self-regulatory anD co-regulatory meDia structures
Concerning other regulatory media structures, the CSA has formal and informal rela-
tionships with the Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes 
(ARCEP) that regulates telecommunications since 2005. Former members of the CSA have 
become members of ARCEP. With the Autorité de la Concurrence, the relationship is less close, 
as it deals with matters of economic transparency. 
In terms of policy and reporting (indicators...), CSA is also in a relationship with Centre 
National du Cinéma (CNC) and Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA).
In matters of protection of minors, the CSA is closely associated with the Safer Internet 
Programme of the EU, as the CSA is a member of the steering committee. The CSA board 
member in charge of protection of minors is a member of the expert committee of Action 
Innocence, the French chapter of the Swiss NGO, which has no legal mandate , something 
which is rather problematic in terms of independence and representativity (http://www.
actioninnocence.org/suisse/web/Comite_d’Experts_239_.html, last consulted 10/09/2012).
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Concerning self-regulatory media structures, the CSA has formal relationships with 
the Autorité de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité (ARPP, ex BVP) whose mission is to 
oversee advertising from the perspective of professionals, in consultation with civil society 
and the CSA among others as of 2008. 
There are no relationships with the Conseil National du Numérique (CNN), created in 
2011.
At the European and international level the CSA is a member of the European Platform 
of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA)
2. functionS
2.1 major functions of the csa
According to the law, the CSA has the power to authorize broadcasting agreements 
and to establish services and obligations. It must negotiate the contracts with each operator, 
even in domains that pertain to the general interest, like the protection of minors. It aims at 
maintaining the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity as well as the balance between 
various opinions, existing rights and expectations of different sections of the public. 
In its early days and even today, it incorporated a research department (that commis-
sioned studies, including ones from independent researchers when need be). It produces a 
newsletter and an annual report.  It has full regulatory powers, and it has a certain degree 
of freedom to apply sanctions (broadcasting corrections, fines, formal summons). It tends to 
exert soft pressure on the media industry in matters of creating labelling codes or classifica-
tory systems.
Some of its main functions are to ensure the quality of public service and to establish 
public service obligations for private operators and to apply measures for the protection 
of minors. Public service obligations relate to commercial as well as public channels. They 
encapsulate the rights and duties of media in relation to their public. They are implemented 
in the case of news (through measures like the candidate access rule and the personal attack 
or political editorializing rule). In fiction, especially in advertising, in youth programming and 
in documentaries there are also rules, partly established by the law and developed in detail 
by the CSA. The CSA has very little to do though with local media (no particular attention 
is paid to priority topics to be dealt with for the community as decided by local authorities). 
The measures for the protection of minors enforce existing children’s rights. These are 
often incorporated in the public service obligations. It can lead to procedures like scram-
bling or protecting anonymity, as well as asking for official permission to broadcast news 
or fiction where children are featured.  This set of measures is characterized by a juxtaposi-
tion of various rules, according to the period of emergence of the different media and the 
moment of negotiation of the TV license, and it tends to show a relatively global coherence 
(except for some minor points).  
The CSA has been a pioneer in establishing parental warning systems (“la signalé-
tique”). They aim at classifying programmes prior to broadcasting according to their content, 
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by signalling the presence or absence of violent or pornographic messages as well as other 
categories of material that might damage young people’s sensibilities. They belong to a 
subset of the measures for the protection of minors and the public service obligations. 
Their nature and their structure have been agreed upon collectively by the channels, but 
then each of them elaborates its criteria and establishes its screening committees. They are 
associated with scheduling restrictions. They give a strong ethical signal, and though they 
were perceived at first as a form of censorship, they have progressively been accepted as a 
form of parental decision-making tool. 
2.2 the regulation in Different meDia sectors
The field of competences of the CSA has to do with audiovisual sector, radio and 
TV and media-on-demand. It has no authority in matters related to the Internet (that is 
for ARCEP). There is a clear separation between the CSA and ARCEP, except in the matter 
of online audiovisual services where the CSA is the regulator, especially in matters of the 
protection of minors (not within ARCEP’s mandate).  Currently there are several proposals 
concerning a merger between these two entities, especially as expressed by the new politi-
cal power in 2012 and by M. Boyon, the current president of the CSA. 
Media content regulation covers advertising but only subsequent to self-regulation by 
ARPP. The CSA does not interfere much with the content of advertising but more on issues of 
overtime, hidden publicity or promotion of tobacco or alcohol (over authorized time).  
In the communication law (article 43-11), the mission of media education is part of 
the mandate of France Televisions, the public service grouping of channels. This is stated 
in very general terms:   “Elles concourent au développement et à la diffusion de la création 
intellectuelle et artistique et des connaissances civiques, économiques, sociales, scientifiques et 
techniques ainsi qu’à l’éducation à l’audiovisuel et aux médias.”  
An examination of these missions and obligations reveals that they are kept to  a 
minimum. France 5 is the only channel that provides some content of this type, with no 
programmes for young people below 18 years of age nonetheless.   For instance, the 2010 
reports signals two programmes on the topic (Médias le magazine, on Sunday on France 5, 
and Votre télé et vous, every month on France 3, with the news ombudsman of the channel).  It 
also mentions three internet sites developed by the group:  Curiosphère.tv, Lesite.tv and Ciné-
lycée, each with different activities that could come under the category of media education.  
The CSA is not expected to perform other duties according to other social actors, 
except in the case of protection of minors in the media where no other entity is present. The 
major mission of CSA remains the regulation of the audiovisual sphere. Internet is not really 
regulated, in spite of many policies such as HADOPI, CNIL, CNN, Ministère de l’Intérieur…  A 
reform is currently being prepared. 
There is a functional distinction between state, self and co-regulatory mechanisms 
but this seems to be due to the evolution and history of media in France. Cinema is the 
result of co-regulation integrated within the state system, with a commission of classifica-
tion that is made up of professionals, representatives of association in defence of families 
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and ministries. Television and radio have a dual system, with public and private sectors, and 
co-regulation is thus externalized, especially via the CSA. Internet seems to be subject to a 
mix of state control, regulation and self-regulation, in fluctuating ways. 
3. legitimizing / underlying valueS
Pluralism, protection of minors, respect for the dignity of the person, respect for public 
order are among the principles and values that are used to legitimate state intervention in 
the media via the regulatory body. Apart from pluralism, these are not principles specific to 
the media sphere.  There is no written normative doctrine (like the “fairness doctrine” in the 
USA) that organizes the regulatory part of the state in a coherent body of values and actions. 
The overall reference is the French Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 and the European 
“Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales”, particularly 
the right to expression. The evolution of protocols and laws comes from European directives 
(TV Without Frontiers and then AVMS), from technological innovations (terrestrial digital TV, 
connected TV, SMAD), and the emergence of social issues that affect policy as a whole (minor-
ities, discrimination, violence against women, for instance), with consequences on media.   
As a result the law of September 30th 1986 is the basic reference for audiovisual 
regulation. It has been modified about 60 times, to accommodate the evolutions mentioned 
above. In matters of pluralism and anti-trust, the law of 1986 has been modified more than 
40 times, particularly in order to include thresholds of ownership within media markets. 
Public service companies are excluded from the field of application of anti-concentration 
rules because the promotion of pluralism and diversity is already part of their missions. 
For private sector operators, measures to guarantee internal and external pluralism are 
included, notably in terms of limiting to 49% the amount of capital held by a single indi-
vidual or legal entity. With the launch of Digital Terrestrial Television, the threshold applies 
to stations with more than 2,5 % average annual audience share. The example of article 15, 
concerning youth protection is also telling:  it moved from 2 lines in 1986 to 15 lines today, 
taking into account the creation of “signalétique” in 1996, the transposition of TV Without 
Frontiers in 1997 and 2000 and a number of extensions (to mobile phones, in 2007, and to 
media on demand, in 2009, as a result of the new directive AVMS).  
In fact, the creation of “signalétique” is a rare case of  the CSA anticipating the law, 
after a series of multi-stakeholder consultations and a research report. In general, CSA 
presidents tend to underplay the role of their institution and avoid attracting attention to 
it. When they do, it is to justify actions of consultation or of coercion with the will to avoid 
controversy. For instance the sanctions against Skyrock, the youth radio (about anti-gay, 
sexist and obscene language) were not advertised widely though they implied heavy fines 
(50 000 and 200 000€).
Nonetheless, some ministers have taken the initiative of intervening in the field, 
with official reports being required on specific themes: Minister of Culture Jean-Jacques 
Aillagon (2002), Minister of Justice Dominique Perben (2002) Minister of Family Ségolène 
Royal (1996) and Nadine Morano (2009). Some members of Parliament have also called for 
specific reports  (Yves Bur 2002, David Assouline 2009, Chantal Jouanno 2012).
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* * *
Officially, principles of freedom of speech, pluralism, diversity, protection of funda-
mental rights are of such constitutional importance that they cannot simply be arranged 
in an identifiable hierarchy. But the architecture of legal texts shows a clear dominance 
of the principle of freedom of speech and communication. This is partly due to the weight 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular article 10 on freedom of 
expression as the guiding principle for media regulation. The French tradition does none-
theless state that such freedom can be legitimately limited by law (article 11 of the French 
Declaration of the Human Rights of Citizens), as some other values and principles can be 
brought to bear (responsibility, pluralism…). In the communication law of 1986, freedom of 
expression is stated in article 1.  
Several French legal tools and sites have the legitimacy to analyse and make deci-
sions about such constitutional principles as freedom of expression, pluralism, protection of 
minors, independence of media, diversity, with a variety of appreciations.  The Constitutional 
Council can do so before the proclamation of a law, if asked for by 60 senators or deputies 
and (since 2008) by individuals within the framework of a lawsuit requiring constitutional 
evaluation   (“question prioritaire de constitutionnalité”). The State Council can be asked to 
appreciate the legitimacy of CSA decisions a posteriori. This allows for such principles as 
privacy, protection of intellectual property and right to the image of a person to run counter 
to freedom of expression. The Court of Cassation is called upon on issues related to the right 
of the press, privacy, right to the image of a person, libel, etc. 
In general, the French judges of these different Councils and Courts do not directly 
use the European Convention but they tend to take into account European jurisprudence 
in the matters at hand. The legality of infringements on freedom of expression depends 
on their nature that has to be neither general nor absolute, on the constitutionality of the 
principles which are set against them. The judge appreciates the compatibility (“concilia-
tion”) of the various principles, and the “balance” between these principles as proposed by 
legislative measures.
It is to be noted that one of the principles that could complement the right to freedom 
of expression is the right of the public to access information. But such a right is not clearly 
formulated or recognized in French law.
* * *
The values defended by the CSA in terms of regulation are not the same as those safe-
guarded by self-regulation and co-regulation, but some self-regulatory mechanisms tend to 
align themselves onto the values and processes of the state regulator. 
The regulation by the independent authority is done in rather narrow and technical 
sectors. This is supported by the French Constitutional Council where the judges also ensure 
that  domains entrusted to the administrative regulation are not too wide. It ensures that 
the law remains the primary reference, and is a warrant of civil liberties because of the 
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public debates that take place, in particular in Parliament.  For instance, on July 27th 2000, 
the judge annulled a disposition that would have made public the hearings held by the 
CSA for the nomination of the presidents of France Télévisions and other public companies 
(Radio France, audiovisuel extérieur de la France), putting transparency after the freedom of 
speech necessary during such hearings and the risks of damaging privacy.  
As for self-regulation or co-regulation, they are not as such registered in the national 
legal apparatus and the word appears nowhere in French legislation. Self-regulation was 
created by the private sector in order to avoid a finer regulation but it is not generally 
framed or supervised by the law. Self-regulation in advertising tends to integrate the values 
of regulation as exemplified by some recommendations published on the site of ARPP.org 
concerning the image of the human person, eating habits, race, ethnicity, religion, childhood, 
safety). Its objective is to strengthen the legitimacy of this professional sector and to elabo-
rate a preliminary control that the professionals who have agreed to it can use as guarantee, 
in principle, that they don’t run the risk of contravening the law and the regulation.  
Co-regulation does not exist legally but some forms of multi-partite decision-making 
could be considered as such.  The classification of programmes (“signalétique”) is a form 
of co-regulation between the CSA and the channels. The CNC that classifies movies also 
works by consultation with a panel of professionals and experts. The “Forum des droits de 
l’internet” used to have such a role for Internet (but has been replaced by a self-regulatory 
business alliance, CNN). At the European level, the classification of video games by PEGI is 
recognized in France. So, there are many variations and levels of co-regulation, some more 
multi-stakeholder than others, some more integrative of expert opinion than others, etc. 
4. performance
It is difficult to appreciate the whole performance of the regulatory authority, as the 
CSA presents the dual characteristic of having very clear mandates on the one hand (espe-
cially in the matter of license allocation, reporting and sanctioning if need be), and on the 
other hand, of enjoying enlarged competences that are subject to its own discretion. 
The CSA is relatively well-endowed in terms of administrative services and qualified 
staff (308 persons in 2011), which enables it to meet its obligations and fulfil its missions. 
It publishes an annual report (in July) about them, as part of its duties. It is very useful for 
researchers and experts because it gives reliable and reusable information. This report is 
complemented by the stock-taking assessments of the various channels that are published 
in Autumn and give public access to the activities of the operators.
The law not only creates legal duties for the CSA, it also grants it some competences, 
which are possible fields of action, subject to its own appreciation. Besides reporting (on 
matters of content), the CSA has few legal obligations. The content examined the most relates 
to the issue of pluralism, about which the CSA has an obligation to publish every month its 
data on political speech in the news (especially important in times of elections). For the 
other types of content, this obligation is an annual one. Most of the activities of control of 
content are based on a discretionary decision taken by the CSA on its own initiative. This is 
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the case when there has been an infringement to the principles that are under its protection 
as defined in articles 1, 3, 13, 15 in particular: child protection, dignity of the person, incite-
ment to violence or hatred for reasons of race, gender, religion or ethnicity, fairness in the 
news and pluralism. It also evaluates if the infringement is grave enough to entail a penalty 
or a formal demand (any penalty that must be preceded by a formal demand).
Not all its areas of competence can give rise to decisions susceptible to a penalty. 
Such issues as quality of programmes, social cohesion or the representation of diversity are 
domains in which the legislator has authorized the CSA to act but without determining any 
threshold. As a result, the CSA has sometimes anticipated the law as in the case of diversity, 
when it produced a report on the representation of visible minorities on French screens, 
in 2000, before the law was modified to that effect in 2006, within the legal framework of 
equality of opportunity. Once the report is published, the CSA often proceeds by requesting 
the operators to make commitments that they measure more than they evaluate in their 
implementation stage.  No situation has appeared yet where the CSA might have had to 
enforce a penalty for commitments that were not kept.
The margin that separates the spheres of action required by the law in favour of a 
societal objective and the spheres of action to ensure their enforcement by media opera-
tors can be narrow. When the CSA does not wish to act in the name of respect for human 
dignity for instance, it intervenes in the name of child protection (and requests measures 
of classification) or in the name of programme quality (with even more flexible requests, as 
exemplified in the recent report on reality programming, in September 2011). 
Several areas of action are currently of interest to the CSA, especially ones related to 
sustainable development, media education and obesity-related health issues. But the effi-
ciency of the agency in actually having an impact and transformative change is low, as the 
publication of results is rarely followed by recommendations or policy-change. For example, 
the amount of scientific programmes that are supposed to sensitise the public to develop-
ment (article 7 of France Television charter) is questionable and asymmetrical: most of them 
are broadcast on France 5 (1060h out of a total of 1343h, or around 80%) and less than 10% 
are broadcast in prime time (94h out of a total of 1343h), according to the 2010 report (p. 
77). The fact that the most watched channel of the group, France2, only broadcast 4h17 and 
France 4, the channel for young people, only broadcast 5h50 went by without comment. 
Besides, when the contents of these programmes are analyzed, it appears that very few of 
them are really educational, except maybe for the programme “C’est pas sorcier”. Some of the 
Internet sites of the group, such as lesite.tv or Curiosphère are used, arguably, to compensate 
for the omissions of the channels, but they are not evaluated either. No recommendations 
for correcting the balance are being made.
The same situation applies in the case of media education (article 15 of France 
Television specifications). The article even mentions the need of programmes to target very 
young children. But none of the programmes listed in the report fall under the category of 
youth programming. The only actions related to this obligation are relegated to the Internet 
where, in some cases they are not targeting the general public of parents and children but 
rather specific publics, in high school, as on the site Ciné-Lycée. 
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The complexity of the societal issues and the number of actors implicated can also 
account for some discrepancies between legal competences and actual performance of the 
CSA. It can be characterized by a regulatory style that favours sensitization of actors over 
constraints and sanctions or even prohibitions.
The case of health is revealing in this matter, as the CSA acknowledged after due pres-
sure from civil society organisations, particularly consumer groups and UFC Que Choisir) the 
obesity epidemic and considered it as being related to advertising for over-sweetened foods 
and drinks that encouraged nibbling and snacking while maintaining children passively in 
front of their screens. The CSA intervened in 2009 by drafting a charter that it brought to 
the TV channels, the advertisers and a number of operators (France Télévisions, Lagardère 
Active, TFI, M6, NRJ12, NT1, TMC, Direct 8, Arte France, Disney France) to sign, as well as the 
various ministries implicated (health and agriculture). Among the other signatories were 
the Syndicat National de la Publicité Télévisée (SNPTV), the Association des Agences Conseil 
en Communication (AACC), the Union des Annonceurs (UDA), the Association Nationale des 
Industries Alimentaires (ANIA), the Autorité de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité (ARPP), 
the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD), the Syndicat des Producteurs de 
Films d’Animation (SPFA), the Syndicat des Producteurs Indépendants (SPI), the Union Syndicale 
de la Production Audiovisuelle (USPA). They all agreed to engage in a process of support of 
public policy on health, especially the Programme National Nutrition Santé (PNNS), coor-
dinated by the Ministry of Health  (CSA report 2011). The CSA grounded the legitimacy 
of its intervention on the absence of any legal measure in the matter, and connected it 
to the protection of minors in the media, that falls under its mandate and discretionary 
competences. It put forward Articles 3-1 (on health) and 439 on its capacity to suspend a 
programme coming from another member state of the EU.  
As a result of this multi-stakeholder agreement, the increase in the number of 
programmes related to this issue was impressive (78%) though in fact it doesn’t represent 
that many programming hours (159h for France Télévisions, across its five channels, though 
the original agreement mentioned 60h to 75h). The closer analysis of the contents of these 
programmes shows mitigated results: they do carry the obligatory mention of the site of 
the Ministry of Health but they do not seem to insist on health as much as aesthetics and 
economics. In the years to come, they’ll be observed by 3 experts on children’s health. 
The CSA presents this process and its success as rather unique, when it communi-
cates about it (see communiqué of May 11th, 2011 after the signature by the Ministry of 
Agriculture). But it glosses over the fact that other countries have taken different positions 
and strategies, more stringent, such as the prohibition of such advertising during certain 
hours of the day when children watch television in Great-Britain. The lack of evaluation and 
follow-up is also characteristic of the CSA policy of sensitizing but not sanctioning.
In its daily activity, the CSA tends to complement the activities of self-regulation and 
co-regulation entities, often acting after the public and private operators have done so. In 
matters of advertising, CSA and ARPP are complementary: the ARPP makes its decision and 
gives advice before broadcasting, whereas the CSA can only intervene after the fact. The CSA 
can contradict a decision by ARP on some matters (protection of minors, health…). 
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Co-regulation in France, in this domain, is fully integrated into the workings of regula-
tion and thus tends to avoid situations of conflict. It is considered to be a part of regulation, 
with the participation of representatives of the media sector and other regulatory entities.  
The potential for conflict can exist between different regulatory authorities, whose 
mandates can overlap. The Autorité de la Concurrence and the CSA have been in conflict over 
the sale and acquisition of media. For instance, the Autorité annulled the acquisition of TPS 
and CanalSatellite by Vivendi Universal and Canal Plus in 2011, and has authorized it since 
but with drastic injunctions, to avoid a quasi monopoly situation.  In the area of protection 
of minors, the CSA is the only regulatory body and as result no conflict with other (self) 
regulatory bodies arises.
When citizens, media companies or other actors disagree with the CSA, there are a few 
appeal mechanisms, all outside the CSA that does not have a complaints bureau (contrary to 
other authorities elsewhere). To overturn a particular decision taken by the CSA, the opera-
tors can appeal to the Conseil d’Etat directly and they regularly do so. The case is different 
for citizens, as there is no formal right to appeal or complain. The only exception is if the 
citizen has a right to act (“droit à agir”), i.e. he is directly and personally implicated by the 
CSA decision. 
The law  (article 42) however recognizes the right for family associations (historically 
they were the first to hold this privilege and for a long time) and also associations in the 
defence of women and viewers as well as trade unions of the media sector to ask the CSA for 
a formal notice procedure, against operators in particular. The wording of the article implies 
that should the CSA fail to do so, the plaintiffs could appeal to the court to override the CSA 
refusal of the procedure, but this procedure has not yet been tested. 
5. enforcement mechaniSmS / accountability
The legal mechanisms to ensure compliance with the CSA decisions are diverse 
in nature. The CSA has the power to decide to apply a formal notice procedure, which is 
published in the Gazette (Journal Officiel), against which the operators can appeal to the 
administrative judge. The CSA decisions to apply a penalty are checked by the judge, espe-
cially when the penalties result in pecuniary fines that pertain to the domain of the tax 
authorities. By law, the CSA has the means to intervene if its decisions are not followed.
But in the actual facts, some of these decisions are not effectively followed such 
as the decision to stop one day of broadcasting that was not respected by radio stations 
for young people, in the 1990s. They were bracing themselves against the CSA’s authority 
and the CSA could legally start new procedures and strengthen the penalties, but it is not 
always in its political interest to do so. The government was supporting youth radios and 
therefore it could lose some of its credibility. Since the 2000s, these scenarios have not 
appeared any more, partly because the CSA has kept well away from current events and 
societal clashes.  
The CSA tends to avoid strictly binding guidelines. It very rarely applies penalties 
on media content, and it is reluctant to start formal notice procedures. It can formulate 
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“recommendations” or produce deliberations that clarify its expectations for the respect of 
certain principles. The recommendations are explanations that clarify the principles of the 
law and can give rise to a penalty. But most of the time, the CSA tends to stop just before the 
stage of the penalty, and sends mails to the channels called “warnings”.
Examples taken from the annual report for 2011 show this soft hand strategy. Formal 
notice procedures were taken against the 3 channels that provide continuous informa-
tion for infringement on pluralism (around the controversy due to the first ever socialist 
primary). In advertising, BFM was notified for going over the time limit for advertising and 
C+ for promoting tobacco. Only 4 formal demands dealt with ethics or child protection: 
TF1 was notified for inaccuracy and for humiliation (in the reality programming broadcast 
Qui veut épouser mon fils?) that contravened article 10 of the agreement with TF1; Paris 
Première was notified for infringement of child protection (broadcasting of material not 
suitable for minors without the age logo 16). But no penalty was applied in this domain 
(the penalties relative to the contents in 2011 concern NRJ’s breach of quota laws and 
advertising infringements by BFM and France TV). In matters of child protection, the CSA 
pronounced only 3 formal demands concerning inappropriate classifications, while it sent 
33 “simple” mails to various channels. The CSA itself brings attention to the fact in its 
report (p. 11), noting that the only penalties taken against reality programming have to do 
with product placement. 
This soft hand strategy per se is not in itself questionable or open to criticism, as 
it is important that the operators understand the requests which are made of them, and 
their interpretation by the CSA. But the end result seems to be that the indulgence of 
the CSA, as made visible by the small number of formal notice procedures, may not be 
conducive to modifications in the behaviour of the broadcasters (as verified in the case of 
reality programming).
In the domains that do not fall under legal obligations, the penalties by definition 
cannot be used. The impact of the CSA is then entirely connected to the publication of 
information, reports, barometers (diversity), even the signature of charters and agreements 
(food health) that give rise to reports themselves.  
The CSA itself is accountable to the government. It gives its annual report to the 
President of the Republic, to the government and to the presidents of both assemblies. It 
also has to provide a number of reports to Parliament, as for example on the advertising 
for on-line gambling. The CSA also chooses to create committees and to publish its own 
reports as exemplified by its commission on the evolution of programming, and by its report 
on reality programming Television. 
It tries to take part in international comparisons (in particular on the quality of the 
programs). But it is subjected to no control, except that of the Cour des Comptes (that checks 
the validity of its budget and expenses). The relations with Parliament are kept to a mini-
mum, because in fact they tend to vary according to the missions that the Parliament gives 
itself. The CSA does communicate to Parliament any information that this one might require. 
The CSA board members are subject to incompatibilities to safeguard their independ-
ence, as specified by article 5 of the law. Their functions are incompatible with any elective 
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mandate, any public employment and any other professional activity. Subject to statutory 
provisions N 57-298 of March 11th, 1957, on literary and artistic property, the members of 
the board cannot, directly or indirectly, exercise official functions, charge fees, except for 
services provided before taking office, nor hold interests or shares in any media or advertis-
ing company. However, if such is the case, the member of the board is given a three month 
deadline to comply with the law. 
6. inStitutional organization / compoSition
Board Staff Media sector Civil Society
9 board members known as 
“conseillers” gathered in a “College”. 
They each take on some of the 
missions demanded by law to the 
CSA, such as child protection (such 
as implementation of “signalétique” 
or observatory of diversity). Their 
decision requires a majority of the 
votes. 
308 members of the 
staff in 2011. Organised 
in 7 “directions” services, 
with specific missions, 
related to the missions 
of the CSA board (see 
list below)
Not directly, though 
many “conseillers” come 
from that sector. Media 
are consulted in “public 
consultations” or during 
“concertations” such 
as the recent one that 
gathered the operators 
of social media in France. 
They are supposed to 
give their position on the 
matter at hand.  
Civil society is not repre-
sented but can be consulted 
on specific domains and be 
part of commissions that 
examine a future decision. 
It can be present in advisory 
councils. The major repre-
sentatives are CIEME and 
UNAF for children’s issues. 
They give their advice and 
offer their perspective on the 
matter, often in contradis-
tinction io the operators.       
The board members are renewed 
every 2 years by a third.   Their 
mandate of 6 years is not 
renewable.
Most of the activities 
are stable. Some surveys 
are outsourced
No mandate No mandate
They are appointed by decree by the 
president, but 3 only are desig-
nated by him; 3 others by head of 
Parliament, 3 by head of Senate,  
According to university 
diploma and “direction” 
need 
By operators them-
selves, according to 
competences 
By civil society itself, accord-
ing to competences and time 
availability
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Source: http://www.csa.fr/Le-CSA/Presentation-du-Conseil/Les-services/Organigramme
7. funding
In 2006 senator Patrice Gélard wrote a report on the problems related to independent 
administrative authorities such as the CSA. It shows that its budget amounted to 34 millions 
€ in 2006 (38M € in 2011), one of the biggest budgets for such entities, surpassed by far 
nonetheless by the one authority in control of financial markets (63M €). But this report 
raises the question of the link between independence and financial autonomy, as well as the 
question of the gap between the stagnation of the means in staff and in financing, while the 
scope of channels to be controlled and its attendant activities have strongly increased. The 
number of channels was multiplied by 6 between 1991 and 2004, without counting digital 
terrestrial TV.  The budget of the CSA already stood at 31.7M in 1994, and the staff of 278 
(vs. 308 today). The budget of the CSA however was increased in 2010 (passing from 34M to 
39M), before dropping again (38M €).
The accounts (expenses and revenues) of the CSA are subject to the control a poste-
riori of the Cour des Comptes and of the joint committee of finance of Senate and Parliament.
In France licenses are free and the penalties are not added to the budget of the 
authority that pronounces them, but go to the financing of the audiovisual sector.
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The annual report of the CSA gives some global elements about its financing and the 
evolution of its human resources.
8. regulation in context
The number of TV channels and radio stations is very large in France and covers the 
local as well as national mediascape. The television offer features the France Televisions 
group, with 7 national public channels (France 2, 3, 4, 5 and Ô+, Arte and LCP) and a flurry 
of private operators, such as TF1, M6, BFMTV, Direct Star, Direct 8, Gulli, iTele, NRJTV, NT1, 
TMC, W9, available for free over the air. The national channels by subscription are Canal+, 
Eurosport, LCI, Paris Première, Planète, TF6. There are also 50 local and regional channels 
such as Alsace20, direct Azur or Tele Bocal. Thematic channels are also numerous, on cable, 
satellite or via the Internet (ADSL).
The radio offer features a great number of public stations of Radio France (France 
Inter, France Musique, France Culture, le Mouv’, France Bleu, FIP). Other public radios are 
Radio France Internationale (RFI) and Radio France Outremer (RFO). The private stations are 
organized in networks among which the main ones are RTL Group  (owned by Bertelsmann), 
Lagardère Active (Europe 1 and Europe 2), NRJ Group (Chérie, Nostalgie), NextRadioTV (RMC, 
BFM), Sud Radio Groupe, Groupe Orbus (Skyrock) and Espace group, a gathering of indepen-
dent stations that share advertising strategies. A whole flurry of regional and local radios is 
also part of the landscape, characterized by linguistic specificities, around Alsatian, Breton 
and Basque languages for instance.   
Delivery systems and Internet penetration are high though France tends to lag 
behind most developed countries in Europe. The pay-TV market is expanding, with four-play 
offers (television+ landline phone + mobile phone + broadband internet). Mergers such as 
CanalSatellite and TPS Platforms, and services like Orange and FreeTV that offer ADSL TV, high-
speed telephone and Internet services, are upcoming. Between 1999 and 2009, the penetra-
tion rate of Internet has been multiplied by 10, from 7% to 60%, from 3 million persons 
connected to 29 million, according to the Observatoire des usages d’internet (Médiamétrie, 
May 2009). The penetration of mobile telephones is expected to reach 40% by 2014 (up 
from 12% in 2009). One of the major obstacles to penetration is the slow level of computer 
sales and the changes due to broadband infrastructure. 
* * *
The French national media sector presents some general features similar to other 
European countries and characteristics of its own. Among the features shared with Europe, 
the public-sector presence is strong and varied (France Televisions has numerous channels, 
including overseas). It benefits from strong state support in terms of subsidies, aids and 
taxes granted to all media; besides receiving “redevance”, it is also allowed to capture reve-
nues from advertising, even if the reform of 2009 suppressed advertising after 8 pm so as to 
preserve the revenues of the commercial channels and to increase the distinction between 
public and private sectors. The other common feature with Europe is the oligopolistic nature 
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of the media markets and the increasing trend towards concentration (see Lancelot report). 
TF1, the leading private operator (owned by construction magnate, Bouygues) enjoyed until 
recently around 30% of the audience share and more than 50% of advertising revenue. 
M6, the more recent private operator (controlled by the German group RTL/Bertelsmann) 
enjoyed about 13 % of the audience share and 22% of advertising revenue. More recently, 
in 2012, the audience share of TF1 has dropped to 22% while M6 remained relatively stable 
but, all in all, altogether these two operators take the lion’s share of advertising. 
Among the peculiarities of the French media sector, fragmentation is one.  France 
does not have a large multimedia group comparable to Germany (Bertelsmann) or Spain 
(PRISA). Vivendi’s expansion from 1999 to 2001 could have created one, but the difficulties 
experienced in the United States prevented this evolution. Paradoxically then, the group 
with significant presence in the 3 markets of radio, television and the press is the German 
group RTL (Bertelsmann).
Another specific point about the French media system, that makes it akin to the United 
States, is the presence of large industrial groups that are not related to the media sector: 
Bouygues Telecom (TF1, TPS, 8 thematic channels) is a section of a huge construction corpo-
ration; Vivendi (Canal+ group and its thematic affiliates) is ex- Lyonnaise des Eaux, special-
ised in urban services and utilities; the Lagardère Group (34% of CanalSatellite, Europe FM1 
and Europe FM2 radio network, thematic stations…) is  also involved in car manufacturing 
and has a stake in  European aeronautics (with a participation in EADS). 
The consequences of this situation are various: fragmentation prevents the French 
media from competing at the international level with bigger conglomerates such as GE, 
Disney, CBS, Viacom, News Corp, Bertelsmann, Sony. Besides the weight of industrial groups 
out of the media sector represents a conflict of interest (especially in the matter of news 
fairness and pluralism). Finally, these groups are closely related to the state, as visible in 
their regular success in winning tenders for public services and facilities. They are also 
closely related to the CSA, where they participate in committees and commissions, with a 
strong lobbying capacity that can also explain the soft hand strategy adopted by the regula-
tory entity.
To counterbalance the weight of such corporations, the CSA tries to favour audio-
visual diversity through two types of regulations: a system of external pluralism to prevent 
an individual or legal entity from simultaneously controlling several media markets and 
systems; multimedia anti-concentration rules.  Following the law, CSA has made it illegal to 
own more than one national TV service but exceptions are being made for Digital Terrestrial 
Television, where the same entity can own up to seven authorisations at national level. The 
digital turn is putting a lot of pressure on the CSA to slowly abandon its classic media rules 
but its relevance remains significant and the current reform of the CSA and its rapproche-
ment with ARCEP may lead to increased attention being paid to the transfer of the values 
of pluralism and anti-concentration on the digital sphere, though there is no guarantee of 
such process as yet.
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9. ignored dimenSionS
• The choice of board members is a key issue for the performance of the CSA. Some 
personality may block a process or stall decision-making.  Though the staff is 
selected on its competences, it is not the case necessarily with the “conseillers”, 
who are not necessarily chosen for their competence or their engagement in the 
media sector, especially in matters of contents.  The profile of the board members 
tends to show a bias in favour of journalists or TV anchors as well as high-ranking 
officials, that may be efficient in maintaining good relations with operators but 
does not make up for the lack of legal-minded specialists or representatives of 
civil society.   
• CSA does not communicate constructively about its decisions or initiatives on 
content, as if it did not want to draw attention to this enlarged competence. When it 
does communicate, as in the case of “signalétique”, in spite of well-made awareness-
raising campaigns, it is without much conviction, as if not to hurt the operators, to 
the detriment of the civil society sector that upheld the measure. So there is a need 
to consider the weak articulation between CSA and the grassroots associations that 
are concerned with matters of diversity, human rights, protection of minors… 
• CSA does not have a clear policy as to the role of the audience. There is no complaints 
bureau, which makes it difficult to pay attention to the expectations of the public. 
The complaints that are received are carefully analyzed and it may lead to decision-
making but, once more, there is no official recognition of their role and very little 
public communication and awareness about the issues at hand. The absence of such 
a bureau means that criticism emanating from the audience is not likely to reach 
the programme managers and the news editors. The presence of an ombudsman in 
the public service channel is not advertised much either. Such an absence creates 
problems in relation to the right to correct information, to the respect of a person’s 
public image, to the possibility of asking for reply. There is no monitoring of the rights 
to reply in case of personal attack or political editorializing.
• The lack of integration of the convergence of content on different technological 
platforms is also problematic, as content regulated over the air may slip unnoticed 
on the digital networks, a point particularly problematic for the protection of young 
people.  The digital turn presents the risk that the actual levels of regulation will 
slacken rather than be maintained, on the argument that there is no scarcity and 
that the multiplicity of media outlets per se serves pluralism and other human 
rights values. 
• The narrow economic focus of the research department within the CSA is also detri-
mental to content evaluation, on societal issues such as harmful content or TV for 
babies, for instance. Every time the CSA wants to involve itself in an issue, it tends 
to outsource the research that leads to specific reports, mostly to survey institutes 
(and not to independent, public university researchers as in the case of the Catalan 
CAC). This procedure is not always transparent and may lead to bias in research, not 
to mention the extra cost of outsourcing.
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• The participation of civil society in the consultations by the CSA requires some 
vigilance. This is particularly the case in situations when independent associations 
are solicited to take shared responsibility with the industry on issues over which 
final control is left to the free play of competition. In the case of “signalétique”, the 
classification of programmes, done by the broadcasters, exemplifies this dilemma. 
Participation in the administration councils of public or private media is another 
example, as civil society can retain a measure of control on the global editorial line 
but not manage the daily decisions of broadcasters. 
• The evolution of civil society organization is under-estimated by the CSA though 
they have become a real force in France. The Collectif Interassociatif Enfance et 
Médias (CIEM, renamed CIEME in 2010) has been active in trying to create an active 
critical awareness of the general public on issues like the rights of minors and 
other rights related to communication and information. It aims at establishing prin-
ciples, recommendations and standards of practice and to disseminate them.  It 
encourages cooperation agreements among the different actors implicated in the 
media process.  It has lobbied the CSA in order to be consulted on major issues that 
apply to basic principles of the protection of minors (having to do with advertis-
ing, violence, Baby TV…).  It is involved in advisory councils for programmes as the 
CSA officially appoints council members who come from the world of education 
and of paediatrics. The case of Baby TV is quite telling: civil society, in this case 
represented by CIEM and paediatricians, was successful in getting the attention of 
the Ministry of Health and the prohibition by the CSA of channels for children under 
three located in France. Despite this success, and for political reasons, the govern-
ment of Nicolas Sarkozy did not see it fit to provide civil society lay associations 
with the means to become a full actor in co-regulation, on a par with the other 
sectors (State and Media sector). This can have an impact on the co-regulatory 
evolution of the CSA in the future.
 
